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 Taxes and Agrarian Life in Early
 Modern France: Land Safes, 1550-1730
 PHILIP T. HOFFMAN
 Between 1550 and 1730, privileged investors in France-nobles, officers, and
 wealthy merchants-bought up enormous quantities of land from peasants. The
 transfer of property has attracted considerable attention from historians, but it has
 never been satisfactorily explained. The paper invokes the tax exemptions the
 privileged enjoyed to account for the transfer-an explanation that fits both the
 chronology of the land sales and the identity of the purchasers. The paper then
 examines how the tax system throttled growth in the agricultural sector.
 SOCIAL historians of early modern Europe have by and large ignored
 taxation. The neglect is perhaps understandable: social history itself
 arose as a revolt against traditional political history and all that it
 entailed, including the operations of the fisc. Yet taxation had a large
 effect on the common people of early modern Europe, an effect far
 beyond the seizure of coins from their pockets. Those who were
 supposed to pay taxes strove to escape the fiscal burden, and people
 caught in the tax collector's grip sought to manipulate the system. When
 the Muscovite government imposed a household tax in the seventeenth
 century, for example, families "doubled up to cut their taxes." The
 result, one historian claims, was the birth of the extended family in
 Russia. In sixteenth-century France the taxes levied on Parisian meat
 and livestock drove butchers, consumers, and livestock dealers to trade
 in towns outside the capital; and Parisian students worked their way
 through school by placing their personal exemptions from wine taxes at
 the service of vineyard owners.1 Moreover, the structure of taxation
 can inform broader issues, such as the shape of social stratification, the
 persistence of communal property rights, and the causes of economic
 stagnation. By ignoring taxes, then, the social historian overlooks their
 direct impact and blinds himself to a major influence on society.
 One such influence was the great wave of land sales in France. From
 approximately 1550 to the early 1700s nearly every region of the
 kingdom saw merchants, lawyers, royal officials, and noblemen buy up
 Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLVI, No. 1 (March 1986). ? The Economic History
 Association. All rights reserved. ISSN 0022-0507.
 The author is Associate Professor of History and Social Science at the California Institute of
 Technology, Pasadena, California 91125. He wishes to thank the following individuals for their
 suggestions and criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper: Philip Benedict, John Benton, James
 Collins, Lance Davis, Jonathan Dewald, Jack Goldstone, Donald McCloskey, Kathryn Norberg,
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 ' Richard Hellie, Slavery in Russia, 1450-1725 (Chicago, 1982), pp. 413, 419, 705-6; Martin
 Wolfe, The Fiscal System of Renaissance France (New Haven, 1972), pp. 318, 323.
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 land from debt-ridden peasants, either by purchasing the peasants'
 fields outright or by foreclosing on mortgages. The records of the great
 exchange fill page after page of notarial registers, and it was obvious
 enough to have attracted the attention of contemporaries. In Lyon, for
 instance, the local historian and minor humanist Guillaume Paradin
 described in 1573 how the city's wealthy merchants and bankers had
 been buying land from peasants at bargain prices:
 The poor laboureurs, lacking enough to eat, were constrained to put their lands up for
 sale at rock bottom prices to rich people, who thereby acquired good lands and
 vineyards for a morsel of bread. In this way, many have built beautiful farms and villas,
 constructing their country houses upon the misery of paupers.2
 Evidence from Saint-Genis-Laval, a small market town south of Lyon,
 exemplifies what Paradin observed in the Lyonnais and what his
 contemporaries observed in other regions of France. In Saint-Genis,
 peasant land passed into the hands of bourgeois from Lyon; the
 purchasers from Lyon were the sort of merchants and bankers whom
 Paradin had in mind.3 In 1388, citizens of Lyon owned a mere 4.1
 percent of the land in Saint-Genis, and in 1493 they owned not much
 more-only 12.4 percent. But their ownership increased to 33.0 percent
 by the late seventeenth century-a transfer of close to 300 hectares
 (Table 1).
 Although they began a bit earlier than in other places, the land sales
 and the rush to invest in land in Saint-Genis-Laval were in fact
 symptomatic of what was happening throughout France. In Dauphine,
 for instance, ecclesiastics and nobles (including noble officeholders)
 were buying up peasant land. South of Paris, in the community of
 Avrainville, it was Parisians-chiefly royal officials. They increased
 their share of the land from 19 percent in 1546 to 57 percent in 1664-
 1674. Peasants in Avrainville went from owning 47 percent of the land in
 1546 to 20 percent in 1664-1674 and under 17 percent in 1688. In the
 nearby villages of Antony and Monteclin the story was similar: peasant
 ownership dropped from 26 and 27 percent in the middle of the sixteenth
 century to 15 percent or less in the late seventeenth century. The same
 story can be told of numerous other regions, from Picardy in the north
 to Languedoc in the south, and from Burgundy in the east to the Gatine
 Poitevine in the west. Nearly everywhere, the French peasant, who had
 2 Quoted Richard Gascon, Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siecle: Lyon et ses
 marchands, 2 vols. (Paris, 1971), vol. 2, p. 841. For additional instances of contemporary
 complaint, see Archives municipales de Bourg-en-Bresse (Ain), AA 11; and Llewain Scott Van
 Doren, "War Taxation, Institutional Change, and Social Conflict in Provincial France-The Royal
 Taille in Dauphin6, 1494-1559," Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 121 (1977), p.
 84.
 3 It should be stressed that urbanites were not the only outside buyers in Saint-Genis-Laval. Nor
 were all the purchasers of peasant land wealthy.
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 TABLE 1
 PERCENT OF LAND IN SAINT-GENIS-LAVAL OWNED BY RESIDENTS OF LYON
 Hectares Percent of Total
 Date Owned Land in Saint-Genis
 1388 54 4.2
 1493 160.44 12.4
 1517-1518 265.11 20.5
 1687 * 33.0
 1787 * 25.0
 * not available
 Source and Note: Archives municipales de Lyon, CC 49-50; Marie Thdrese Lorcin, Les
 campagnes de la region lyonnaise aux XIVe et XVe sieles (Lyon, 1974), pp. 382, 395; Georges
 Durand, Vin, vigne, et vignerons en lyonnais et beaujolais (Lyon-Paris, 1979), p. 439.
 Figures for 1388, 1493, and 1517-1518 were taken from Lyon tax records, which give the area of
 holdings belonging to residents of Lyon. For 1687 and 1787, Phad to rely upon terriers, as reported
 in Durand. The terriers concern only land that was subject to the seignior-a major portion of the
 community but not all of it. Hence, acreage totals for the terriers are not directly comparable to the
 earlier area totals. The figures for 1493 and 1517 differ slightly from those given in Lorcin, p. 395
 (135 hectares in 1493), and Richard Gascon, Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siecle, 2 vols.
 (Paris, 1971), vol. 2, p. 818 (200 hectares in 1517-1518). The differences may result from their
 having excluded pasture land from their totals.
 emerged from the Middle Ages in a relatively strong position, with
 effective ownership of large amounts of land, found himself falling into
 debt and selling his property to merchants, royal officers, and nobles.4
 Marc Bloch called the influx of money into land "the most decisive
 event in French social history," and Fernand Braudel made it figure
 prominently in the "defection of the bourgeoisie," whereby early
 modern merchants abandoned commerce in favor of land, offices, and
 the trappings of nobility. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie described the land
 transfer as changing "completely the structure of villages, of land
 holding, and of rural society." The land sales, he and others argued,
 undermined the independence the French peasantry had achieved at the
 end of the Middle Ages and helped create a dominant class of noble and
 upper bourgeois landlords. The landlords consolidated their holdings,
 and although the consolidation and the concomitant losses by small
 4 Bernard Bligny, ed., Histoire du Dauphine (Toulouse, 1973), pp. 196-98, 206-9, 242-48; Van
 Doren, "War Taxation," pp. 70-96; Jean Jacquart, La crise rurale en Ile-de-France, 1550-1670
 (Paris, 1974), pp. 104-34, 724-52; idem, "Immobilisme et catastrophes," in G. Duby and A.
 Wallon, eds., Histoire de la France rurale, vol. 2 (Paris, 1975), pp. 251-75; Emmanuel Le Roy
 Ladurie, "De la crise ultime a la vraie croissance," in Duby and Wallon, Histoire, vol. 2, pp. 424-
 39; idem, "Les masses profondes: la paysannerie," in E. Labrousse and F. Braudel, eds., Histoire
 economique et sociale de la France, 4 vols. (Paris, 1970-82), vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 622-32, 786-99;
 idem, Les paysans de Languedoc, 2 vols. (Paris, 1966), vol. 1, pp. 459, 567-81; Gaston Roupnel,
 La vile et la campagne au XVIIe siele: Etude sur les populations des pays dijonnais (Paris, 1922;
 2nd ed., 1955); Louis Merle, La metairie et revolution agraire de la Gdtine poitevine de lafin du
 Moyen Age d la Revolution (Paris, 1958); Pierre Deyon, Amiens, capitale provinciale: Etude sur la
 society urbaine au 17e sicle (Paris, 1967), pp. 323-38. For more on the peasants' effective
 ownership of land at the end of the Middle Ages, see Marc Bloch, French Rural History: An Essay
 on its Basic Characteristics, trans. by Janet Sondheimer (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1970), pp.
 106-49; and Robert Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-
 industrial Europe," Past and Present, 70 (1976), pp. 46, 59, 68-72.
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 peasants were never carried to the extremes of engrossment in England,
 they did undeniably alter the face of French agriculture.5
 Historians agree on the chronology of the land sales and on the
 identity of the buyers. Give or take a decade or two, most would concur
 with Le Roy Ladurie that "the great epoque of massive peasant
 expropriation near Lille, Paris, Dijon, Macon, and even Montpellier
 was . . . the difficult period from 1560 to 1720." Near Paris and Lyon it
 started rather earlier. Everywhere the land sales accelerated after the
 middle of the sixteenth century. They ceased about 1730, except
 perhaps in the region about Toulouse, where land sales may have
 continued well into the eighteenth century.6 The purchasers were men
 of privilege: nobles, royal officials (often ennobled or on their way to
 ennoblement), and wealthy urban lawyers and merchants.7
 Yet historians have not devised a satisfactory explanation for the land
 sales. Indeed, most of the reasons offered fail to account for the
 chronology or the identity of the purchasers. Often, for example, the
 transfer of property is explained by the poverty of the peasants. Real
 though it was, the poverty was merely a symptom, not a cause. We need
 to know precisely what it was that reduced the peasants to poverty,
 forcing them to sell their land. Why did they not sell before 1550 or after
 1730? The mauvaise conjuncture, or unfavorable economic conditions
 particularly during the "crisis" of the seventeenth century, seems
 equally vacuous as an explanation. If mauvaise conjuncture meant
 reduced profits from farming, why did nobles, officers, and merchants
 continue to buy farms? It is by no means clear in any case that returns
 from agriculture did fall during the land sales. Agricultural lease rates,
 which provide a good index of the expected profits to be derived from
 farming, actually rose in many parts of France in the first half of the
 early seventeenth century, when enormous quantities of land were
 5Bloch, French Rural History, p. 125; Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterra-
 nean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. by Sian Reynolds, 2 vols. (New York, 1972-1973), vol. 2,
 pp. 725-34; Le Roy Ladurie, "La paysannerie," p. 795. For an argument that tends to downplay
 the ultimate significance of the land sales, see Brenner, "Agrarian Class Structure," pp. 73-75.
 6 Jacquart, "Immobilisme," pp. 259-75; Le Roy Ladurie, "Vraie croissance," pp. 424-29, 594;
 idem, "La paysannerie," pp. 622-32, 786-99; Bernard Chevalier, Les bonnes villes de France du
 XIVe au XVIe sihce (Paris, 1982), pp. 129-49. For the exceptional case of Toulouse, see Le Roy
 Ladurie, "Vraie croissance," pp. 428-29, 594; and Georges Freche, Toulouse et la region midi-
 pyrenees au siecle des lumieres (vers 1670-1789) (np, 1974), pp. 164, 187-209, 457-89. The
 evidence for continued land sales near Toulouse after 1730 is less than conclusive. Freche (whose
 work Le Roy Ladurie refers to) relies almost exclusively upon tax records from the 1680s or 1690s
 on the one hand, and from the late eighteenth century on the other, and despite his assertions about
 greater sales after 1730, such tax records say nothing about the detailed chronology of transfers.
 After all, the land could have changed hands in the years 1680-1730. Furthermore, the figures
 Freche does have for loss of peasant land are often strikingly small.
 7 Jacquart, Ile-de-France, p. 733; idem, "Immobilisme," pp. 259-75; Le Roy Ladurie, "La
 paysannerie," pp. 786-99; idem, "Vraie croissance," pp. 424-29; Chevalier, Les bonnes villes, pp.
 129-49; Georges Huppert, Les Bourgeois Gentilshommes (Chicago, 1977), pp. 39-50.
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 changing hands.8 Profits did decline during the crisis years later in the
 seventeenth century; but we are left without an explanation of the
 earlier sales.
 If on the other hand the mauvaise conjoncture means an abnormal
 succession of crop failures, then we must somehow demonstrate that
 the fluctuations of agricultural revenues were greater between 1550 and
 1730 than in other years. It would be possible to do this (one could
 imagine a world in which a higher variation in agricultural revenues
 favored large investors who could spread risks more effectively, and
 one could test for a higher variance of revenues using tithe or lease
 records). But the available quantitative evidence suggests that revenues
 did not vary more than normally between 1550 and 1730.9
 A related explanation involves population growth and diminishing
 returns in agriculture. Le Roy Ladurie and others have argued that
 increases in population fragmented peasant holdings and reduced many
 farms to such an extent that they were no longer profitable.'0 Left with a
 pitiful existence on a tiny scrap of land, many a peasant was forced to
 sell. The problem with this argument is that the land sales continued and
 even accelerated when the national population was stagnant or falling
 (in 1628-1638, for example, or during the years around 1700) and in
 regions that suffered persistent population decline (Ile-de-France, Bur-
 gundy). In such times and places one would presume that the size of
 farms would stabilize and that peasants would have no reason to sell.
 But the sales of land continued."
 8 Jacquart, "Immobilisme," pp. 250-52.
 9 Three tithe series and one series of farm harvest records from various regions of France suggest
 that gross revenues were no higher in the years 1550-1730 than before or after. For two of the series
 the coefficients of variation of gross revenues were in fact lower in 1550-1730 than before or after,
 and in the other two series, although the coefficients of variation were higher, the differences were
 so slight that they were not significant, even at the 0.25 probability level. (Here gross revenues are
 defined as tithe collections times price for the tithe series and harvest times price for the harvest
 series.) Using deviations from a moving average of gross revenues led to similar results. Gross
 revenues, of course, are not profits, and tithe records always pose problems. The fluctuations of
 gross revenues, though, ought to have accounted for most of the variation of profits, and the tithe
 records used are better than most. They were collected annually in kind, and they come from
 holdings where the area farmed and the tithe rate did not vary significantly. The source for the three
 series of tithe records, the series of harvest figures, and the associated grain prices are: Le Roy
 Ladurie, Paysans de Languedoc, vol. 2, pp. 820-22, 844-48 (prices and tithe of wheat at Beziers,
 1587-1757); Hugues Neveux, Vie et declin d'une structure economique: Les grains du Cambresis
 (fin du XIVe-debut du XVIIe siecle) (Paris, 1980), pp. 396-99, and Joseph Goy and Emmanuel Le
 Roy Ladurie, eds., Les fluctuations du produit de la dime: Conjoncture decimate et domaniale de
 lafin du Moyen Age au XVIIIe sieuce (Paris, 1972), pp. 58-66 (prices and tithes of wheat and oats at
 Cambrai, 1401-1633); Ren6 Baehrel, Une croissance: La basse provence rurale (fin XVIe siecle-
 1789) (Paris, 1961), p. 554, and Goy and Le Roy Ladurie, Les fluctuations, pp. 245-53 (prices and
 wheat production figures from the farm of Saint-Louis-de-Casau near Arles, 1621-1786).
 1O Le Roy Ladurie, Paysans de Languedoc, vol. 1, pp. 261-314, 457, 490-91; Jacquart, Ile-de-
 France, pp. 247-53.
 " For periods and regions of population decline, see Jacques Dupaquier, La population
 franqaise au XVIIe et XVIIIe siecles (Paris, 1979), pp. 11-13, 38-39, 41. For Ile-de-France and
 Burgundy, see Jacquart, Ile-de-France, pp. 681-82, 699-701, and Roupnel, La vile et la
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 And this line of reasoning neglects the strategies that peasants
 adopted in times of population growth. In the countryside around Lyon,
 for example, peasants sought work in the city when the population was
 rising. They married later, limiting the size of families and bringing
 fragmentation to a halt. They shifted to labor-intensive cultivation, such
 as viticulture. Since the labor-intensive crops seem to have permitted a
 profit even on small plots of land, it is not clear that population growth
 and estate fragmentation (even when they occurred) would have forced
 peasants to sell.'2 And population growth does not explain why nobles,
 officers, urban merchants, and other privileged investors predominated
 among the buyers. The market for land in France was fairly well
 developed, and peasants could have traded among themselves to avoid
 excessive fragmentation. Yet it was outsiders who made the over-
 whelming majority of the purchases.
 Similarly, it is not enough to invoke the security and prestige that
 property ownership conferred to explain the land sales. Owning proper-
 ty undoubtedly fulfilled a variety of nonpecuniary desires, but there is
 no reason to believe that these became more pronounced after 1550, and
 less pronounced after 1730. Furthermore the nobles, officers, and
 privileged bourgeois who bought farm land seemed often more con-
 cerned about profits than one might have supposed. Consider, for
 example, the illustrious Gadagne family from Lyon. Enormously
 wealthy, they purchased estates in Saint-Genis-Laval and other parts of
 the Lyonnais. They were singled out by Marc Bloch as a banking and
 mercantile family which abandoned trade for the greater status (and
 eventual ennoblement) that seigniories and rural properties conferred. It
 is true that the Gadagnes bought seigniories and chateaux, and filled
 their home in Saint-Genis-Laval with expensive furniture and works of
 art. Yet they made a great effort to round out their agricultural holdings,
 as if they were concerned about economies of scale in administration,
 and they invested considerable money in converting grain fields to more
 profitable vineyards. To say that the Gadagnes and other officers and
 merchants among the land buyers were merely aping the older military
 nobility's taste for chateaux is unsatisfactory. Although they did
 purchase an occasional chateau, they also bought considerable amounts
 of peasant land, which carried none of the honor of a seigniory. And
 they paid too much attention to the business of estate management and
 campagne. In the Les paysans de Languedoc, vol. 1, pp. 567-81, Le Roy Ladurie abandons
 population growth and fragmentation as explanations for purchases of land by urban elites after the
 mid-seventeenth century. The reason is that by this time the population was declining in
 Languedoc and fragmentation had ceased. By his logic, though, the sales to elites should have
 stopped as well.
 12 Georges Durand, Vin, vigne, vignerons en lyonnais et beaujolais (Lyon, 1979), pp. 225-50,
 363-86, 445-62, 507-10.
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 felt too much disdain for the profligacy of military nobles for the charge
 to ring true.13
 A far better explanation for the land sales-one that fits both the
 chronology and the identity of the land buyers-is the French tax
 system. The connection between the land sales and taxation is simple.
 While peasant farms bore the brunt of increasingly heavy taxes during
 much of the period from 1550 to the early 1700s, the nobles and
 privileged urbanites who spent money on land generally evaded most of
 the taxes on their rural holdings. The peasant had to pay the taille,
 which combined features of a land tax and a levy on agricultural income.
 If he sold his produce in a urban market he might also have to pay excise
 taxes known as aides. In most parts of France, however, a noble or
 privileged urbanite did not have to pay the taille, and if he did pay it he
 usually escaped at a lower rate. Moreover, he could often sell wine and
 produce from his lands in the city where he lived without paying a full
 share of the aides. 14
 Near Lyon, for example, if an urban merchant purchased a vineyard
 from a peasant, the vineyard would in effect be withdrawn from the
 taille rolls of the peasant's village. The merchant would in theory pay a
 tax on this property as part of Lyon's own levy on real property, but his
 assessment would be far less than the portion of the taille the peasant
 had originally paid. Furthermore the merchant could bring wine from
 his own vineyard into Lyon without paying the aides. Although the wine
 he imported was ostensibly for his personal use, he could easily sell it.
 As the intendant of Lyon complained in 1687, nearly every bourgeois
 landowner in Lyon took advantage of his exemption from the aides to
 turn a profit selling wine from his estate.15
 Elsewhere in France, privileged city dwellers, officeholders, and
 nobles generally enjoyed similar exemptions, despite efforts made in the
 13 Bloch, French Rural History, p. 124; Joseph Cartellier, Essai historique sur Saint-Genis-Laval
 avant la Revolution (Lyon, 1927; reprint, Saint-Genis-Laval, 1980); Archives departementales du
 Rh6ne, 3 BP 1886 (May 12, 1595), 3869, 3872, fols. 92-98, 163. This assessment of the Gadagnes
 and their ilk draws upon Huppert, Les Bourgeois Gentilshommes, pp. 24-50, 115-19, 141-44;
 Chevalier, Les bonnes villes, pp. 129-49; and Jonathan Dewald, The Formation of a Provincial
 Nobility (Princeton, 1980). One could argue that the tightening of the market for government offices
 pushed members of the privileged elite to buy land, but the cost of offices did not rise until the end
 of the sixteenth century, well after land sales began. Nor do office prices explain the end of the land
 sales in 1730. Similarly, the fluctuations in the value of other investments, such as rentes, do not
 appear to explain the sales, and it would be difficult to argue that the security of land, albeit
 considerable, suddenly increased after 1550 and thereby attracted money into the countryside.
 14 In areas of taille reevle, where tax exemptions were tied not to persons but to pieces of land,
 privileged persons would (at least in theory) have paid the taille on land purchased from
 commoners. In practice, though, they too often escaped with low tax assessments.
 '5 Gascon, Grand commerce, vol. 2, pp. 862-66; Durand, Vin, pp. 481-84; Marcel Marion, Les
 imp6ts directs sous lancien regime principalement au XVIIIe siecle (Paris, 1910), pp. 187-88. See
 also Wolfe, Fiscal System, pp. 312, 325-27.
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 seventeenth century (particularly by Colbert) to reform the aides and to
 make the privileged pay the taille on their rural holdings. 6 The taille in
 theory would fall upon any tenants who leased land from tax-exempt
 owners, but the exempt were often able to spare their tenants from
 taxes. In seventeenth-century Normandy, for instance, a noble or a tax-
 exempt officer could work one of his farms and all of his meadows
 without paying the taille. Although he was supposed to hire wage labor
 to do the farming, he could rent the land out and claim that the tenants
 were domestics. On his other farms his tenants might have to pay the
 taille, but they almost always did so at a lower rate, usually because the
 privileged landowner had managed to reduce their assessment. In 1645
 in the Norman community of Saint-Ouen-de-Breuil, for example, tenant
 farmers (many of whom rented from the tax-exempt owners, holding 75
 percent of the land) paid only 35 percent of the taille per acre that
 peasant owners did. The same held true in many other regions of
 France: tenants of privileged landlords might appear on some taille
 rolls, but they generally paid at a lower rate if they paid at all. As the
 military engineer and tax reformer Vauban remarked in 1707, tenants of
 the privileged were assessed "in name only." Even in many areas of
 taille reelle, where exemptions from the taille were attached to particu-
 lar pieces of land and not to individuals, members of the elite managed
 to reduce their tax burden by manipulating the assessment figures in the
 communal cadastres.'7
 16 Edmond Esmonin, La taille en Normandie au temps de Colbert (1661-1683) (Paris, 1913), pp.
 225-28, 250-56, 271-72; Wolfe, Fiscal System, pp. 310-15; Roland Mousnier, La venalite des
 offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII (Rouen, 1945), pp. 352-56; idem, The Institutions of France
 under the Absolute Monarchy: 1598-1789, trans. by Arthur Goldhammer and Brian Pearce, 2 vols.
 (Chicago, 1979-84), vol. 1, pp. 125, 172-73; vol. 2, p. 58; Richard Bonney, Political Change in
 France under Richelieu and Mazarin (Oxford, 1978), pp. 272-73; Jean-Jules Clamagdran, Histoire
 de l'impot en France depuis l'Ppoque romaine jusqu'd 1774, 3 vols. (Paris, 1867-1876; reimpres-
 sion, Geneva, 1980), vol. 2, pp. 357-59, 619-20; Marion, Les imp6ts, pp. 9- 1.
 17 Esmonin, La taille, pp. 151, 160, 225-28, 250-56, 364-68; Mousnier, Vnalite, pp. 412-15;
 idem, Institutions, vol. 1, pp. 172-73; vol. 2, pp. 58, 433-35; Bonney, Political Change, p. 448;
 Pierre Deyon, "A propos des rapports entre la noblesse frangaise et la monarchie absolue pendant
 la premiere moitid du XVIIe siecle," Revue historique, 231 (1964), pp. 342-43, 354-55; [Sebastien
 le Prestre de] Vauban, Projet d'une dixme royale: Suivi de deux crits financiers, ed. E. Coornaert
 (Paris, 1933), pp. 27-28, 36-37; Bernard Bonnin, "Un aspect de la society rurale: Les milieux
 dominants en Dauphin6 au XVIIe siecle," in J. P. Gutton, ed., Lyon et lEurope: Hommes et
 societes: Meanges d'histoire offerts d Richard Gascon, 2 vols. (Lyon, 1980), vol. 1, pp. 60-61;
 Clamageran, Histoire de l'imp6t, vol. 2, pp. 357-59, 619-20. For comments made in 1717 that
 resemble Vauban's, see [Franqois Vdron de Forbonnais], Recherches et considerations sur les
 finances de France depuis 1595 jusqu'en 1721, 6 vols. (Liege, 1758), vol. 6, p. 131. The royal
 government tried repeatedly to tax the tenants of privileged landowners, but the repetition of edicts
 suggests that the government's efforts were not tremendously successful, at least until the
 eighteenth century. Even when tenants of privileged landlords were taxed at the full legal rate in the
 seventeenth century, their tax (the taille d'exploitation) fell far below the tax paid by peasant
 proprietors (the taille de proprhete). Whether it was this difference in the legal taille rates or simply
 underassessment of the tenants of privileged landlords, the evidence from Saint-Ouen-de-Breuil
 reveals a huge gap between the taille levied upon rented land and that levied upon peasant-owned
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 The disproportionate tax burden drove peasant owners out of busi-
 ness. Peasant proprietors fell into debt to pay taxes, which began to rise
 in the last half of the sixteenth century and did not level off until after
 1730. In real terms the per capita tax rose nearly sevenfold between the
 1560s and the 1730s; the tax burden increased from roughly 0.4 bushels
 of wheat per person in the 1560s to 2.6 bushels in the 1730s, or from 8
 days labor for a Parisian construction worker and his family in the 1560s
 to over 40 days labor by the 1720s (Table 2, columns 4 and 5).18
 Crushed by the higher taxes, peasant proprietors sold out to privi-
 leged investors. They in turn were willing to purchase the land (and
 willing to pay more for it than any peasant) because it allowed them to
 exploit their tax exemptions. As Vauban remarked in 1707, the exemp-
 tions raised the value of the privileged investors' property relative to
 land held by tax-paying peasants-which presumably dropped in price
 every time the taille was raised.
 land. A regression of taille assessments from the year 1645 (TAILLE, in livres tournois) on the
 acres of land each peasant owned (OWN) and the acres he rented (RENT) yielded the following:
 TAILLE = 11.80 + 0.57 OWN + 0.20 RENT
 R2 = 0.91 n = 78 t = 17.44 t = 19.65
 The hypothesis that peasant property in Saint-Ouen-de-Breuil was assessed at less than twice the
 rate of rental property can be firmly rejected (t = 4.01 with 75 degrees of freedom). It is therefore
 clear that renters in Saint-Ouen-de-Breuil did not pick up the tax for privileged landlords. The
 source for the individual taille assessments, acres rented, and acres owned in Saint-Ouen-de-Breuil
 comes from an unusually complete 1645 taille roll in Archives dept. de la Seine-Maritime, C 2108
 (1645). I thank James Collins for furnishing me a copy and for the information that 75 percent of the
 land was in the hands of the exempt.
 18 Rough estimates suggest that taxes also increased as a fraction of agricultural output: Michel
 Morineau, "La conjoncture ou les cernes de la croissance," in Labrousse and Braudel, Histoire
 economique, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 980. Peter Mathias and Patrick O'Brien, in "Taxation in Britain and
 France, 1715-18 10: A Comparison of the Social and Economic Incidence of Taxes Collected for the
 Central Governments," Journal of European Economic History, 5 (1976), pp. 601-50, arrive at
 similar figures for the wheat equivalent of per capita taxes in the eighteenth century. The labor
 equivalent of the tax burden was derived using figures in Micheline Baulant, "Les salaires des
 ouvriers du batiment a Paris de 1400 a 1726," Annales, 26 (1971), pp. 463-83. The calculation
 assumes that the Parisian worker is the sole support for a family of four. The 40 days he spends
 working for the fisc amounts to approximately 16 percent of the labor year. See also Charles Tilly,
 As Sociology Meets History (New York, 1981), p. 203. It should be pointed out that the central
 government's tax receipts, which form the basis of Table 2, actually understate the weight of royal
 taxation in the provinces, for they ignore collection costs and omit tax revenues that were spent
 directly in the provinces without being remitted to Paris. On this and related matters, see Van
 Doren, "War Taxation," p. 70; William Beik, "Etat et society en France au XVIIe siecle: La taille
 en Languedoc et la question de la redistribution sociale," Annales, 39 (1984), pp. 1270-98; and
 James B. Collins, "Sur l'histoire fiscale du XVIIe siecle: Les impots en Champagne entre 1595 et
 1635," Annales, 34 (1979), pp. 325-47. Still, despite the problems with the central government's
 tax figures, the few long-term series of local tax receipts that we have do sketch the same
 chronology for the rise in real taxes: see, for example, Le Roy Ladurie, Paysans de Languedoc,
 vol. 2, p. 1026, and Beik, "Etat," pp. 1281-83. One might wonder whether Table 2, which includes
 all tax levies, might misrepresent the size of the taille and the aides, the taxes of greatest interest to
 us. The answer is no. Although the per capita taille apparently peaked in the 1670s (separate taille
 and aides figures are not available for all years), aides receipts were increasing, and the sum of the
 two levies probably followed the total tax receipts curve fairly closely.
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 TABLE 2




 Annual Capita Index of Real
 Taxes' Taxes2 Grain Per Capita
 Decade (nominal) (nominal) Equivalent3 Taxes4
 1560/69 10.22 0.60 0.38 100
 1570/79 23.12 1.36 0.67 174
 1580/89 30.39 1.79 0.78 204
 1590/99 24.80 1.46 0.44 114
 1600/09 24.90 1.44 0.65 169
 1610/19 30.37 1.71 0.73 191
 1620/29 43.47 2.39 0.79 207
 1630/39 92.16 4.91 1.59 414
 1640/49 114.64 5.95 1.64 428
 1650/59 126.79 6.42 1.49 388
 1660/69 91.72 4.49 1.23 321
 1670/79 108.95 5.20 1.83 477
 1680/89 119.28 5.59 1.85 482
 1690/99 145.83 6.78 1.66 434
 1700/09 117.99 5.74 1.52 398
 1710/19 130.82 6.23 1.39 362
 1720/29 198.00 9.21 1.95 509
 1730/39 211.00 9.34 2.56 669
 1740/49 223.00 9.61 2.19 572
 1750/59 230.00 9.80 2.25 587
 1760/69 319.00 12.97 2.69 703
 1770/79 362.00 14.03 2.35 612
 'Millions of livres tournois, uncorrected for inflation and devaluation.
 2 Livres tournois, uncorrected for inflation and devaluation.
 3Average annual grain equivalent of per capita taxes (in bushels of wheat).
 4 Constant value livres, with 1560/69 = 100. This column represents the numbers of column 4
 divided by 0.38, the grain equivalent for 1560/69, and then multiplied by 100.
 Source: Unless otherwise noted, figures for total annual tax receipts were taken from Alain Gudry,
 "Les finances de la monarchie franqaise sous l'ancien regime," Annales, 33 (1978), pp. 216-39,
 whose chief source is J. R. Mallet, Comptes rendus de administration desfinances du royaume de
 France (London and Paris, 1789). As Richard Bonney points out in The King's Debts: Finance and
 Politics in France, 1589-1661 (Oxford, 1981), pp. 304-6, Gudry fails to include revenue from a
 source known as the parties casuelles in his tax figures for the years 1611-1656. I have corrected
 Gudry's totals for these years by adding the parties casuelles figures given in Mallet. For 1661 and
 1672-1681, Gudry gives no tax receipts; I therefore relied upon Mallet for these years. Tax figures
 for 1716-1717 come from [Franqois VWron de Forbonnais], Recherches et considerations sur les
 finances de France depuis 1595 jusqu'en 1721, 6 vols. (Liege, 1758), and those for the years after
 1717 are taken from Peter Mathias and Patrick O'Brien, "Taxation in Britain and France, 1715-
 1810: A Comparison of the Social and Economic Incidence of Taxes Collected for the Central
 Governments," Journal of European Economic History, 5 (1976), pp. 601-50. On the basis of
 figures in Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, "Les masses profondes: La paysannerie," in F. Braudel and
 E. Labrousse, eds., Histoire economique et sociale de la France (Paris, 1977), vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 485,
 560-61, 730, and Jacques Dupaquier, La population fran!aise au XVIIe et XVIIIe siecles (Paris,
 1979), p. 11, I assumed that France had a population of 17 million in 1560 and 17 million in 1600
 within contemporary frontiers. Population figures after 1600 were taken from Dupaquier, pp. 11-
 12, 34-37, 81; to correct them for the size of contemporary frontiers, I used figures on the area of
 France given in Roland Mousnier, The Institutions of France Under the Absolute Monarchy, 1589-
 1789, trans. Arthur Goldhammer and Brian Pearce, 2 vols. (Chicago, 1979-1984), vol. 1, pp. 682-
 86. The grain equivalent of per capita taxes and the index of real per capita taxes were calculated
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 The exemptions were large enough to affect land prices appreciably.
 As early as the fifteenth century the annual exemptions from the aides
 enjoyed by a typical magistrate of the Parlement of Paris might be worth
 a quarter of his yearly salary, and they would have been worth more
 under the higher taxes of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 9 The
 tax exemptions, further, could account for the land sales even if a
 privileged buyer was concerned only about his social status: a tax
 exemption would make a prestigious estate less costly to operate.
 A bit of economics will explain why the land sales finally came to a
 halt. In the long run one would expect a peasant to pay for land an
 amount equal to the net revenue it brought in. For a given piece of land
 he would pay the discounted value of the net pre-tax revenue he
 received from the land, minus the taxes he had to pay. The same would
 hold for a privileged landlord, but he would face different costs and
 much smaller taxes, if indeed he paid taxes at all. As an absentee, the
 privileged landlord bore the additional cost of overseeing the land and
 its tenants-disposing of crops from afar, supervising laborers, and
 ensuring that tenants paid their rent and did not abuse buildings, trees,
 or animals. The costs of supervision, which an owner-occupier such as a
 peasant did not have to pay, were of great concern to contemporaries,
 and they could loom large enough to make a distant plot of land
 worthless for an absentee owner.20
 As long as the supervisory costs were low a privileged investor would
 pay more for a piece of land than a peasant because of his lower taxes,
 '9 Vauban, Projet, pp. 27-28; Frangoise Autrand, Naissance d'un grand corps de 1'e'tat: Les
 gens du Parlement de Paris, 1345-1454 (Paris, 1981), pp. 210-43, 351. For additional contemporary
 perceptions of the effect exemptions had on land values, see de Forbonnais, Recherches, vol. 6, p.
 131. In Saint-Genis-Laval in the early eighteenth century, taille exemptions held by three officials
 from Lyon (none of them owners of huge estates) cost the community 700 livres annually, a
 considerable sum: Archives dept. du Rh6ne, I C 51, "Etat du nombre des privildgids." An arret
 from 1734 in the same bundle of documents reveals that an attempt in 1705 to limit tax exemptions
 to contiguous pieces of property caused privileged landlords to consolidate their holdings-further
 evidence of the effect tax exemptions had.
 20 On costs of supervision, see Olivier de Serres, Le theatre de agriculture (Paris, 1600), pp.
 45-54; Dewald, Formation, pp. 183-201. It would be relatively easy to change this simple model to
 include risk aversion, subsistence farming by peasants, or the nonpecuniary benefits that
 landownership conferred.
 Table 2, Sources (continued):
 using as a deflator a nine-year moving average of wheat prices in Paris, derived from Micheline
 Baulant, "Les prix des grains a Paris de 1431 a 1788," Annales, 23 (1968), pp. 520-40.
 Note: Extrapolation was used to fill in population figures for each of the years after 1560. For any
 given decade, the figures in columns 2 through 5 represent averages for the years in the decade in
 question. Tax figures are available in the sixteenth century only for the years 1567, 1574, 1576-
 1577, 1581-1582, 1586, 1588, 1596-1597, and they are missing for 1657-1660 in the seventeenth
 century. In the eighteenth century, figures are given for the following years only: 1700-1703, 1705-
 1715, 1725, 1730, 1734, 1740, 1742, 1751, 1756, 1763, 1768, and 1775 (actually an average for 1773-
 1776). For the difficulties of finding figures for French taxes in the eighteenth century, see Mathias
 and O'Brien, "Taxation," pp. 601-50. For an important word of caution about all these figures, see
 William Beik, "Etat et socfetd en France au XVIIe siecle: La taille en Languedoc et la question de
 la redistribution sociale," Annales, 39 (1984), pp. 1270-98.
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 and as a result the privileged would buy up all land for which
 supervision cost little. His purchases would stop once the costs of
 administering distant estates outweighed the advantages of a tax exemp-
 tion. Since the supervisory costs would increase with distance, privi-
 leged landlords would tend to buy land lying within a certain number of
 miles of their homes; at greater distances they would tend to have no
 holdings. If the privileged landlords all lived within a city-a reasonable
 assumption-then their holdings would therefore tend to cluster, all
 other things being equal, near the city's walls. This is precisely what
 happened in the vicinity of Lyon and Paris.21
 Given the structure of exemptions, the taxes peasants faced were
 bound to increase more than the taxes levied on the privileged, and each
 tax increase would therefore encourage the privileged to buy more land,
 until the costs of administering distant estates once again balanced the
 tax exemptions. The process would come to a halt only when taxes
 ceased to grow, or when the government limited exemptions. In real
 terms, per capita taxes dropped temporarily after 1690, and after
 reaching a peak again in the 1730s they leveled off until late in the
 eighteenth century (Table 2, column 5).22 A campaign against tax
 exemptions enjoyed by privileged landlords and their tenants also
 contributed to halting the land sales. Colbert had taken steps against the
 exemptions but without effect. It was not until the end of the seven-
 teenth century and the early decades of the 1700s that intendants, now
 able to raise flagrantly low tax assessments in individual villages, began
 to crack down in earnest on privileged landlords and their tenants. In
 Saint-Genis-Laval and surrounding communities in the Lyonnais, for
 example, the intendant began as early as 1687 to take steps against
 privileged landowners (in this region, chiefly bourgeois from Lyon), and
 in 1734 the royal government sharply restricted their rights to claim tax
 exemptions for rural holdings. Previous legislation had attempted the
 same thing, but this time the law was enforced. By the 1730s numerous
 bourgeois in the Lyonnais found their property listed on the taille rolls,
 and their tenants paid the taille on the same footing with peasant
 owners. Intendants in other parts of France launched a similar campaign
 against nobles, officers, and other privileged persons. The effectiveness
 of this campaign prevented the land sales from resuming when taxes
 finally rose again late in the eighteenth century.23
 21 Gascon, Grand commerce, vol. 2, pp. 817, 848-51. In Jacquart's study, the one community
 where the peasants retained their land was far from Paris and from the other cities where privileged
 landlords usually resided (Jacquart, Ile-de-France, p. 724).
 22 Mathias and O'Brien, "Taxation," pp. 608-11, reach similar conclusions about the trend of
 per capita real taxes in the eighteenth century. The leveling off of taxes also helped quell endemic
 tax revolts.
 23 For tax reform and the campaign against exemptions, see Marion, Les imp6ts, pp. 6-11, 127,
 129, 131, 187-88, 190-94; Deyon, "Rapports," pp. 354-55; Bonney, Political Change, pp. 424-25,
 433, 437-38; Mousnier, Institutions, vol. 1, p. 172, vol. 2, pp. 433-35; Clamagdran, Histoire de
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 Taxes (and tax inequities) increased considerably in the middle of the
 sixteenth century, at just the time that the money began to flow into
 land. There was not much relief until the early eighteenth century.
 Furthermore, the transfer of peasant land peaked during the periods of
 the greatest tax increases-during the Thirty Years War, for example-
 when the gap widened between what the privileged would pay for land
 and what peasants would accept. One can explain the apparently
 premature transfers of land near Lyon and Paris: the tax exemption for
 rural property owned by the bourgeois of Lyon dated back to 1462, and
 the magistrates of the Parlement of Paris won their exemption from the
 aides as early as the fifteenth century.24
 This is not to say that the inequities of the tax system were the only
 cause. There is for instance an anomaly in the countryside about
 Toulouse. Here population increase might have played a role, and
 elsewhere agricultural crises might have been a contributing factor,
 alongside the tax increases. There may also be some merit to Bloch's
 assertion that the peasants sold their land because they lacked cash
 (unlike the nobles, officers, and other privileged buyers). According to
 Bloch, rising royal taxes forced peasants to come up with hard currency
 to pay their taxes. Without any reasonable source of credit the peasants
 simply had to sell their fields. Bloch's argument assumes, of course,
 that credit markets were imperfect. Most historians would probably
 agree, although the assumption certainly deserves further investigation.
 The risks of agricultural lending were high. It is not enough merely to
 cite evidence of high interest rates in order to conclude that moneylend-
 ers were monopolistic usurers or that credit markets had failed. In
 Saint-Genis-Laval, for example, where many peasants themselves
 engaged in money lending, the market for loans was fairly competitive,
 I'imp6t, vol. 2, pp. 357-59, 619-20, vol. 3, p. 41. Marion contains examples from regions other than
 the Lyonnais where intendants used taxes d'office and other techniques to attack exemptions in the
 late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In the Lyonnais, a royal arret of 1734 concerning
 the bourgeois of Lyon restricted their taille exemption to one contiguous piece of property of less
 than 10 hectares, including woodlands and vineyards. This represented a far more serious limit than
 did seventeenth-century legislation, which did not cover woods and vines and which granted
 bourgeois of Lyon exemptions covering a far more liberal 45-60 hectares. Nobles and officers
 enjoyed even more liberal privileges under seventeenth-century law. Archives dept. de Rh6ne, 1 C
 51, contains the arret of 1734 plus evidence that it was being enforced and that tenants were being
 taxed equitably. See also Archives dept. du Rh6ne, 3 C 96 (1756, 1759), where bourgeois from
 Lyon claim only the limited protection of the 1734 arret. The shift to indirect taxes late in the
 seventeenth century and the new taxes imposed in the eighteenth century (especially the vingtieme)
 further restricted exemptions, for, whatever their failings, these indirect taxes and the vingtieme
 were less riddled with loopholes than the taille. Taille rolls from Normandy also suggest that by the
 eighteenth century, tenants of privileged landlords no longer evaded the taille; see, for example,
 Archives dept. de la Seine Maritime, C 2108, Nossonville (1727).
 24 For an example of land purchases when taxes were high, see Deyon, Amiens, pp. 332-38. For
 Lyon and Paris, see Gascon, Grand commerce, vol. 2, pp. 862-67, and Autrand, Naissance, pp.
 210-43.
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 and it is therefore difficult to trace the loss of peasant land in Saint-
 Genis back to failures of credit markets.25
 In the few areas of France where the privileged could not readily
 exploit tax exemptions, the transfer of peasant land into their hands
 should be insignificant. Lower Provence is one such area. Cheating on
 taille assessments was uncommon there, and the peasants did not
 usually sell their land.26 There is more dramatic evidence of this sort in
 Venissieux, a village south of Lyon, across the Rhone River from Saint-
 Genis-Laval. Although Venissieux was no further from Lyon than
 Saint-Genis, the privileged investors from Lyon behaved differently in
 Venissieux than in Saint-Genis, where they had been acquiring property
 throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (see Table 1). The
 only way to explain the contrast between the two communities is to
 invoke differences between the local tax systems. Venissieux lay just
 over the border of Dauphine, and in Dauphine tax exemptions worked
 differently, at least for absentee landlords from Lyon. Although tax
 exemptions for the privileged existed in Dauphine (exemptions there
 provoked a long legal battle in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries),
 the citizens of Lyon did not enjoy firm immunities for the property they
 owned in the province. In 1545, it is true, the monarchy did exempt
 residents of Lyon from the taille for land they owned in Dauphine, and
 like other local urbanites they undoubtedly possessed similar exemp-
 tions earlier in the century as well. But as early as 1543 the residents of
 villages such as Venissieux placed landlords from Lyon on the taille
 rolls for their local holdings. Though the royal exemption undoubtedly
 kept the villagers from collecting the taxes they had assessed in 1543-
 1544, the same was not true later. By the 1550s, in fact, villages in
 Dauphine had begun to tax the holdings of non-noble urban landlords.
 By the 1640s, after a long court battle, they had moved toward a more
 equitable tax system, which allowed even nobles to be taxed.27
 25 Le Roy Ladurie "Vraie croissance," pp. 428-29, 594; Freche, Toulouse, pp. 140, 164,
 187-209, 457-89, 504; Bloch, French Rural History, p. 140. The evidence from Saint-Genis-Laval
 comes from research I am doing in local notarial records from Archives dept. du Rh6ne, 3 E. Even
 with a number of lenders in Saint-Genis-Laval, the problem of default might have introduced
 imperfections into the credit market. Although this matter of peasant debt occupies a large place in
 the social history of the period, it is largely irrelevant to my explanation for the land sales. Whether
 a peasant owner was driven into debt by taxes or not, the higher price offered by the privileged
 would make him sell his land to them instead of to other peasants.
 26 Baehrel, Une croissance, pp. 403-6, 476-77. In areas where the privileged could exploit tax
 exemptions, the price of land should have remained relatively insensitive to increases in taxes, for
 when taxes rose, the amount the privileged would pay for land would have declined slightly, if at
 all. In areas like lower Provence, by contrast, land prices should have dropped considerably
 whenever taxes increased. The problem with testing this, however, is the nearly insurmountable
 one of getting a long time series of land prices or rents that controls for land quality and a matching
 series of local tax figures.
 27 Gascon, Grand commerce, vol. 2, pp. 862-63; Van Doren, "War Taxation," pp. 82-90;
 Bligny, Histoire du Dauphine', pp. 204-9, 227-49, 257-73.
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 The residents of Lyon thus lost their exemption for property in
 Dauphine in general and in Venissieux in particular. This was probably
 the case by the end of the sixteenth century, and it was certainly so by
 the 1640s. The loss of this exemption would be expected to affect
 residents of Lyon who held property in Venissieux. They should have
 sold their plots once they had to start paying taxes, and the proportion
 of land held by the Lyonnais should have declined. Other investors-
 nobles, for example-might have continued to invest in Venissieux, but
 the Lyonnais should. have given up the ghost.
 This is precisely what happened, if one can believe the taille figures.
 According to the taille roles, the absentee landlords from Lyon owned
 less property in Venissieux in 1661 than in 1543-1544 (Table 3). One
 hesitates, of course, to translate the taille directly into landholdings, for
 elites could manipulate the assessments. The Lyonnais, however,
 lacked the political and legal tools to engage in such trickery in
 Dauphine (if anything, they were likely to be overassessed), and in any
 event they were probably less able to influence the taille rolls as time
 went on. In all likelihood, then, the taille rolls from Venissieux probably
 understate the decline in property ownership by the Lyonnais. By
 contrast, in Saint-Genis-Laval, just across the river, the Lyonnais were
 buying up more and more land (Table 1). The explanation is clearly the
 tax exemption.
 The tax exemptions also shed light on the growing stratification in
 peasant communities. The sort who rose in the peasant communities
 were in the first place those who had the skills to farm or to manage
 estates for the growing number of absentee landlords. They had the
 assets, reputation, and experience needed to be an absentee landlord's
 agent, or fermier; the relationship they enjoyed with landlords might
 bring them lower tax assessments as well. If they were literate they
 might also purchase minor tax-exempt offices. Most important, they
 usually had a stranglehold over village and seigniorial offices, which
 allowed them to manipulate tax assessments and other village affairs in
 their favor. The result was that wealthy peasants-the coqs du village,
 marchands-laboureurs, or fermiers-receveurs-profited. In particular
 they usually paid lower taxes. They acquired farm land and rose in the
 village, while most other peasants lost their property and fell.28
 28 For the stratification of the rural community, see Le Roy Ladurie, Paysans de Languedoc,
 vol. 1, pp. 261-314; Jacquart, Ile-de-France, pp. 248-53, 450-540; idem, "Immobilisme", p. 261;
 Bloch, French Rural History, pp. 136-37. For the village elite's ability to gain tax exemptions and
 manipulate tax assessments (either on their own or via the patronage of absentee landlords), see
 Esmonin, La taille, pp. 151, 160, 225-28, 364-68; and Bonney, Political Change, pp. 181, 446-49.
 For the small offices a member of the village elite might buy, see Mousnier, Venalite, pp. 404-15. In
 addition to earning a return on their skills and assets, the members of the village elite may have
 colluded with the tax-exempt and thus have shared some of the advantages of the tax break. For the
 rest of the peasantry, though, the possibility of splitting the benefits of tax evasion does not seem to
 have been in the cards politically.
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 TABLE 3





 * Figure includes percent of taille assessed to residents of Lyon and all other taille-paying absentee
 landlords. The percent of the taille paid by landlords from Lyon is therefore less (and perhaps
 considerably less) than the 38 percent figure.
 Note: For 1598-1599, three taille rolls were averaged together. For 1661, the area of Feysin was
 excluded.
 Source: Archives dept. de l'Isere, B 3066, fols. 158-99 (1543-1544); AD Rh6ne, E supplement,
 fonds des communes, Venissieux taille rolls (1598-1599, 1661).
 The royal government was concerned about the sale of peasant land,
 for the sale eroded the government's tax base. In the seventeenth
 century the monarchy therefore made an effort to limit tax exemptions,
 and although the king often spoke of these tax reforms as a means of
 protecting the poor, the desire to increase tax revenues always lay
 somewhere near the surface. One example of the monarchy's efforts
 was its investigation of titles of nobility-an investigation undertaken in
 part to reduce false claims to fiscal exemptions. The crown also
 struggled against exemptions and low tax assessments for officers, city
 dwellers, and village elites.29
 The crown took direct measures to stem the sale of some peasant land
 as well. Actually limiting sales by individual peasants was beyond the
 government's means, although it had been attempted in similar situa-
 tions by governments of small German principalities.30 Indeed, no one
 in France appears to have contemplated this alternative, which in any
 case would have been prohibitively expensive to enforce. But the
 government did place restrictions on the sale of the property rights
 belonging to entire villages. Typically, villages in France owned com-
 mons such as meadows, forests, or waste lands, where peasants
 enjoyed communal rights to graze animals or collect wood; and villages
 might possess the vaine pature, the collective right to pasture in
 unenclosed fields. Parish vestries in villages also had plots of cultivated
 land, which might be leased out to help defray village expenses. Much
 of this communal property, though, had to be sold to pay mounting
 expenses during the Wars of Religion, the Fronde, and other crises of
 the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Throughout France the
 villages had to rebuild parish churches devastated by warring religious
 factions, lodge marauding troops or bribe them to stay away, and pay
 for lawyers and court costs in cases involving higher taxes. Villages had
 no alternatives to selling their land and their use rights, such as the vaine
 29 Esmonin, La taille, pp. 57-58, 201-2, 271-72; Bonney, Political Change, pp. 437-38, 446-49.
 30 Friedrich Ltige, Geschichte der deutschen Agrarverfassung (Stuttgart, 1963), pp. 136-37.
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 nature. The communal property ended up in the hands of privileged
 buyers.31
 The peasants who leased vestry land probably paid some taxes, and
 the commons and use rights figured into the assessments for the taille.
 Indirectly, then, the peasants paid taxes on communal land. But once
 this property was in the possession of the exempt, the monarchy lost the
 tax revenue.
 Under Louis XIV the monarchy forced some of the purchasers of
 communal property to return what they had bought, and it squeezed a
 little from other buyers. It also placed the villages in a position of
 financial tutelage. Henceforth, the royal intendants supervised village
 finances, limited communal expenditures and repairs, and prohibited
 the sale or mortgage of communal property. The government's motive
 was simply to prevent further hemorrhaging of taxable assets. One
 consequence of the policy was to make the monarchy one of the main
 guarantors of communal property rights and of communal agriculture in
 general. Its thirst for taxes had pushed it to support both communal
 rights and traditional agricultural practices.32 Communal agriculture in
 France was not swept away by a wave of enclosures, as it was in
 England. 3
 3' See, for example, Jacquart, Ile-de-France, pp. 220-23; Roupnel, La vile et campagne; and
 Mousnier, Institutions, vol. 1, pp. 555-61. For sales of rights to vaine pdture, see Marc Bloch, "La
 lutte pour l'individualisme agraire dans la France du XVIIIe siecle," Annales, 2 (1930), p. 339; and
 Archives nationales, G7 101 (1678). In the late eighteenth century, some 10 percent of the
 agricultural land belonged to the villages: Guy Ikni, "Sur les biens communaux pendant la
 Revolution franqaise," Annales historiques de la Revolution fran!aise, 54 (1982), pp. 73-74. In
 addition to the communal land itself, village use rights such as the vaine pdture could extend (in
 regions such as the northeast) over nearly all a community's arable land.
 32 See Mousnier, Institutions, vol. 1, pp. 559-61, and Hilton Root, "Crown and Peasantry in
 Burgundy, 1661-1798" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1983), the best local study of the
 monarchy's takeover of village finances and its effect upon agriculture. A revised version of Root's
 dissertation is forthcoming from the University of California Press.
 33 For the obstacles to enclosures, see Root, "Crown and Peasantry," and Bloch, "La lutte pour
 l'individualisme agraire," pp. 329-83, 511-56. The peculiarities of the tax system were not the only
 reason communal agriculture was slow to disappear in France, and in the last half of the eighteenth
 century many government officials did push for the passage of enclosure edicts and other measures
 against communal farming. But enforcement of these measures often ended up in the hands of
 staunch defenders of communal rights like the intendant of Rouen, De Crosne. In 1780, for
 example, De Crosne preserved communal rights to a pasture shared by inhabitants of the two
 communities of Petit-Quevilly and Grand-Quevilly even though the residents of Petit-Quevilly
 acknowledged that sharing rights between the two villages cut productivity and frustrated plans to
 improve drainage. De Crosne's reason for his decision was his fear that without these communal
 rights, a number of families in each community would be unable to "pay their taxes." See Archives
 nationales, Q1 1381 (Nov. 28, 1780).
 Since communal land was often marginal, one might ask whether preserving communal rights
 really did depress agricultural productivity seriously. Contemporaries thought so, and it is worth
 noting that certain communal rights, in particular vaine pdture, reduced every property owner's
 incentive to adopt new agricultural technologies. Banning sales of such communal rights to private
 individuals, as the French state did, blocked one simple way to restore the proper incentives (a
 "Coase theorem" resolution of the externalities), and it saddled most new technologies with
 insurmountable free-rider problems. The result was fewer enclosures and fewer agricultural
 improvements in general. This topic will be explored more fully in a book I am preparing on the
 social and economic history of the French countryside.
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 These were not the only costs of the tax system. The taxes drew
 money away from peasants and farmers, and thereby reduced agricul-
 tural development. Why fence a plot of land or drain a fen when the tax
 collector would simply use the improvement as a reason to boost the
 taille? As Vauban complained in 1707,
 things are reduced to such a state . . . that a man who could use his own talent and skill
 in order to ameliorate his life and that of his family prefers to stay as he is without doing
 anything. A man who could raise several cows or lambs, which could improve his farm
 or his land, is obliged to do without them, lest he be crushed by the taille the following
 year, as he most certainly would be if he earned a little something and it was seen that
 his harvest was a bit more abundant than usual.
 To be sure, French taxes on average may not have borne down so
 heavily as some historians once imagined: if the central government's
 figures can be believed, per capita taxes were in fact higher in England
 than in France by the eighteenth century. But French taxes did penalize
 investment, particularly by peasants who lacked exemptions. The net
 effect retarded agriculture.3
 Equally hurtful were the resources wasted avoiding or manipulating
 taxes. Some peasants in Normandy, for instance, paid for fictional
 second residences in cities in order to claim urban tax exemptions;
 others refrained from erecting new buildings that might increase their
 assessment. Time and effort were spent on reducing tax assessments,
 influencing the local elu or bribing the village collector. The tax
 collectors themselves spent resources in the search for bribes. Contem-
 poraries complained that even village tax collectors devoted "all of their
 energy, for days and nights without interruption, to the task of seeking
 out bribes." The result, as one historian has noted, was a "perversion"
 of entrepreneurial talent, a perversion visible even at the village level.
 The tax system diverted resources into the task of "redistributing the
 34 Vauban, Projet, p. 28. Mathias and O'Brien show that by the eighteenth century the central
 government's tax receipts were lower per capita in France than in England, but the central
 government's figures may understate the size of French fiscal levies. In any case, Mathias and
 O'Brien acknowledge that French taxes did seriously penalize investment. This was particularly
 true in agriculture. The French peasant, for example, payed a higher taille if he improved his land;
 by contrast, the eighteenth-century British landowner owed what was in effect a fixed (and in real
 terms declining) land tax assessment that, as Adam Smith noted, "did not discourage ...
 improvements, nor keep down the produce of the land below what it would otherwise rise to."
 Similarly, although the excise on beer in England may have reduced the demand for barley a bit, it
 was also part of a system of protection that guarded British farmers against foreign competition.
 The key here, of course, is not per capita taxation, but the incidence of taxes and their effect at the
 margin, and as Adam Smith noted, French taxes, though apparently lower by the eighteenth
 century on a per capita basis, were far more oppressive. See Mathias and O'Brien, "Taxation," pp.
 614-17, 621-25; Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed.
 Edwin Cannan, 2 vols. in 1 (Chicago, 1976), vol. 2, pp. 352-58, 365, 437-38; C. D. Chandaman, The
 English Public Revenue, 1660-1688 (Oxford, 1975), pp. 9-76, 188-91; W. R. Ward, The English
 Land Tax in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1953), pp. 3-7, 20-22, 34-35, 67, 87-88, 93-97.
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 nation's wealth rather than into increasing wealth."35 It was not a
 costless transfer from the peasantry to the rest of society.
 Did the fiscal system work nothing but harm in the countryside? It
 may have helped create larger, more efficient farms, the sort of farms
 common in England but rare in France. The failure of French agricul-
 ture is traditionally blamed on the lack of such farms, and the exemp-
 tions may have offset some of the harm done by the rest of the tax
 system. But the privileged might well have exploited their managerial
 skills to assemble large, well-run farms without the impetus of tax
 exemptions. Furthermore, when privileged landlords attempted to
 enclose their fields or to undertake other improvements associated with
 English agriculture they faced the obstacle of a government that
 protected communal property rights to preserve its taxes. And the fiscal
 system in any case blocked improvements by the largest single group in
 rural society, the peasants themselves.
 3 Esmonin, La taille, pp. 270-71, 354; Wolfe, Fiscal System, p. 249. See also Vauban, Projet,
 pp. 27-28, 35-38.
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